In this paper we describe a novel method for evidential reasoning [1] . It involves mod elling the process of evidential reasoning in three steps, namely, evidence structure con struction, evidence accumulation, and deci sion making.
It is sometimes difficult enough to make a judgement even if we can observe directly that which we want to judge. But there are many uncertain situations in which we cannot make observations directly. Instead, in such situations, we have to resort to arguments. Arguments, while not directly available from observa tions, link observable facts to unobservable features. And these arguments are then taken as our justifi cations for judgements. Obviously, in our reasoning process, good arguments give excellent justification for our statements, second only to observable facts. Thus, arguments should be a focus for studies of uncertain reasoning.
But in uncertain situations, it is also commonly found that many arguments are presented and that these ar guments might be inconsistent. They might be based on different observable facts or derived from different parts of our knowledge or oriented towards different points of view. In such situations, we have to address the strengths of these arguments for competitive state ments to resolve any inconsistency. A common activity in such situations is to compare the arguments sup porting and refuting competitive statements respec tively. Usually, arguments for competitive statements are weighed with respect to each other, i.e. the ar guments are compared with each other with regard to how trustworthy they are. Then, we make our judge ments according to the results of these comparisons.
It is very desirable to have some standard for mea surement so that we can measure the strengths of all these arguments to find out which statement we should choose as our decision, based on many arguments. But because there are many factors affecting the strengths of arguments, such measures are not easily available and are sometimes not suitable. Moreover, such mea sures may not be necessary in that sometimes only comparisons among arguments are sufficient.
In this paper we describe a method for eviden tial reasoning based on reflecting the above ideas. The method is called 'RfS for Relative Evidential Support. In 'RfS, evidential support relationships be tween statements, called arguments, and their relative strengths, represented by comparisons between argu ments, are represented.
In the following section, we present our viewpoint that evidential reasoning is a process composed of three steps, namely, evidence structure construction, evi dence accumulation, and decision making. In sec tion 2.1, the steps are modelled in the method 'RfS. A simple example is presented along with the exposition of the method. In section 3, a well known example in the literature is analyzed using 'RfS, which provides a basis for us to compare 'RfS against probabilistic methods and the endorsement model. In the last sec tion, a brief summary is given. Some other results of our studies of 'RfS are also listed without going into details.
Our Point of View
For pragmatic purposes, human reasoners must reject the assertion that nothing is true but The Who/e1, where The Whole is the complete truth of the world. We understand something and we have some knowl edge. But at the same time, there is much about the world and about The Whole that we do not know or we do not know exactly. We have to make judgements based on that which we do know, and act on these judgements. The situation is like that in which we are observing a distant object and want to figure out its features. Because it is distant, some of its features can not be observed directly. At the outset, we must know and understand some of the relationships between our observations and the features of the object. Otherwise our observations are useless. Sometimes, we might not really know a relationship, but we believe it. At the same time, we know that some of the relationships are very accurate (or convincing) and some of them are less accurate. Generally speaking, these relationships have strengths of some kind.
With knowledge as described above, we can make our observations. We are guided at this time by our knowl edge that we are looking for observations which we know or believe can be related to the features of the object. Other observations should not be made, be cause they are simply useless for the task in hand.
As the observations are made, some of our knowledge may be triggered to give us justifications for predi cating the features of the object. During this pro cess, some predications might conflict with others. In such cases, we will have to compare the justifications supporting these conflicting predications. As a result, some predications with weak justifications might be overwhelmed by others with stronger justifications.
We view evidential reasoning as a process as described above. Concretely, we view evidential reasoning to be a process composed of three steps, namely, evi dence structure construction, evidence accumulation, and decision making. In the first step, we collect what we know about the relationships between that which is observable and that which we want to figure ou�\ Judging the strengths of these relationships is a very important part of this step. In the second step we make our observations and fit them into the structure. In the last step, we make our decisions based on the result of the first two steps.
In the following section, we propose a model of eviden tial reasoning which reflects these steps directly.
1Though the philosophy of this assertion has its jus tification. See Russell [7] for his description of Hegel's dialectic.
'R.fS-A Model fo r Relative Evidential Support
The semantic model for the method is based on two abstract spaces for making judgements (statements). One space is for sensing evidence and the other is for making decisions.
2 Here we formalize the two spaces as two first order logics. We denote the space for evidence sensing as Ce and the space for decision making as Cp. 3
Evidence (consisting of sentences in the first space) is related to choices (sentences in the second space) only via arguments such as "this evidence sentence supports (or refutes) that conclusion sentence". We denote an argument that "evidence e supports choice p" as (e, p}
and will call such pairs "arguments from Ce to Cp" •4 In (e, p}, we will call e the presumption and p the con clusion. Thus, the word "argument" is taken to have the intuitive meaning "a step in reasoning" rather than a special kind of statement.
It should be noticed that all arguments are conditioned in that an argument will not be enforced unless its pre sumption is satisfied. Thus, an argument {e, p) should be read as "if the presumption e is satisfied, then there is an argument supporting the conclusion p." (e,pt):::: :; (e,p2);
(e1 implies e2 and e1 is not equivalent to e2 in c.), then 2This division is unnecessary. We retain it because it helps clarify the process of evidential reasoning. 3 We suggest that C,. and Cp be delineated in such a manner that the truth of sentences in Ce are readily avail able and the truth of sentences in Cp are what we are seeking.
4We omit arguments such as "evidence e refutes choice p " because they can be represented using (e, p ) in a natural way, as we will show later.
6Notice that the two arguments have a common presumption.
It should be noticed that the constraints on evidence structure are very simple. These constraints guarantee that our structure of evidence is consistent. We believe this requirement is necessary so that even if our obser vations and their implications should be inconsistent in themselves or inconsistent with our knowledge, our knowledge itself should be consistent.
These constraints have intuitive appeal. The first two constraints say that "�" is a partial order relation on A . The third constraint requires that under the same presumption, a statement always commands no more support than any of its logical implications. If state ments are viewed as subsets of the set of possible values for a variable, this constraint simply states that, by the same.evidence, no subset can be supported better than its supersets.
The fourth constraint specifies that any logical impli caiton of a statement cannot enforce stronger support than the statement itself. This constraint is included because when (e1 __,. e2) 1\ -,(e 2 __,. et) , we can say that e1 is more specific than e2 and contains more informa tion. In such cases, we can say that information con veyed in e2 is contained in that conveyed by e1. Thus, all arguments based on e1 can be viewed as based on something which has already taken into account ev erything e2 has to say. In this sense, the evidence space can be viewed as being layered-any thing said at a higher level contains or covers all things which has been said at a lower level. (e1 __,. e2) 1\ -,(e2-+ et) means that e1 is at a higher level than e2. Thus, what said by e2 should be weaker than that said by e1 in the sense that e1 might have nothing more to say than e2, but if it does, these things are more defensible than those based on e2• This includes two kinds of cases. In cases where these additional things based on e1 are consistent with those based on e2, knowing e1 enforces what has been said. In cases where the additional things are inconsistent with those bases on e2, the ones based e 1 will overrule those based on e2 because more considerations are commanded based on er.
For example, penguins do not fly though birds do. Be cause when we are talking about penguins, their being birds has already been considered, then any conclu sions reached from penguin considerations have pri ority over these from only bird considerations. In this case, inconsistency arises but the desirable result should be that penguins don't fly based on the more specific consideration of penguins.
For another example, penguins have legs, so do birds. This is a consistent situation where penguin's having legs is supported by their being penguins and being birds. But obviously, no changes concerning only the legs of birds in general can affect this assertion. In this sense, because more specific considerations are avail able, less specific considerations are overshadowed and Notice the symmetry in the last two conditions that the stronger the evidence but the weaker the conclusion, the stronger the argument.
The last constraint concerns only the presence of ar guments, i.e. the existence of evidential supports rela tionships. The constraint says that for two arguments, the disjunction of their presumptions supports the dis junction of their conclusions. In other words, it says that if one of the two presumptions is granted, then one of the two conclusions is supported. Notice that, by constraint 4,.the argument with the disjunctions is less trustworthy than the original two arguments.
In the relation 'R of an evidence structure CS, two arguments might not be related. But if they are, {e1,p1) � {e2,p2) should be read as "argument (et.PI) is no more believable or no stronger than argument ( e 2,P2 )". Some conventions can be used to denote other rela tionships between arguments. For example, in the fol lowing, we will use (et,p1) :::: {e2,p2) for The knowledge in the example can be represented as an evidence structure as follows.
A., where n.A. is the smallest relation on A satisfying the constraints for evidence structure. This means that we have no information about the strengths of the arguments ( other than that derivable from the subset relations of Ce and Cp)· Notice that in the representation above, evidential refutation "e2, if positive, refutes {Ali}" is represented as evidential supports "e 2, if positive, supports { Al2 } as well as { Ai3 } ". The justifi cation for doing so is that only relative evidential support strengths are im portant in 'R.fS.
Evidence Accumulation
As noted before, all arguments are conditioned in the sense that argument (e, p) can enforce its support for p only if e is satisfied. This provides us with a natural way to accumulate evidence on an evidence structure.
Suppose our information allows us to grant a sentence e in L.e, then we can identify a set of arguments com posed of all arguments whose presumptions are logical implications of e, i.e. the set of all arguments whose presumptions are granted if e is granted and are thus applicable under e. This set and the relationships be tween arguments in this set, compose a sub-structure fSe of fS for any sentence e of Ce. This sub-structure, defined as follows, is viewed as the result of evidence accumulation.
Definition: Let fS = (£., Cp, A, 'R) be an evidence structure and e be a sentence of £.. Then the sub structure fSe = { r.
•• ,cP e •A.,'R.), where
3. A e = {{e',p)l{e',p) E A, e ---+ e 1 } ; 4. n. = 'R n (A. X A.), i.e. the sub-relation of'R on A., is the conditioned evidence structure of fS conditioned on e.
The conditioning on an evidence structure has the fol lowing property.
Corollary 1 Let fS = (C., Cp, A , 'R) be an evidence structure and e11 e2 E £. such that e 1 ---+ e2. Then
The proposition is obvious because any argument trig gered by e2 will also be triggered by e1.
I
This proposition say s that the set of triggered argu ments will not contract with more evidence, i.e. the triggered argument set will expand monotonically with more evidence. But notice that fSe1M, = (fSeJe, is not generally true, which means that evidence accu mulation cannot be done cumulatively. Also notice that, as can be seen later, 'RfS is non-monotonic of the conclusions it reached.
For our example presented in the last section, the evi dence accumulation process is to conduct the tests and condition the evidence structure on the results of these tests. Different results will then issue different struc tures. The resulting conditioned evidence structures with different results of the tests are shown as follows.
The C., Cp and 'R. parts are omitted because the for mer two parts are the same as in the original evidence structure, while the last part is empty except for these relationships derivable from subset relations.
e1 negative and e2 negative e1 negative and e2 positive e1 positive and e2 negative e1 positive and e2 positive
Decision Making
Based on an evidence structure fS and evidence e , a partial relation on £p can be defined with respect to how well a sentence is supported in t:s •.
Definition: Let fS = { £., £p, A, 'R) be an evidence structure and e an item of evidence, i.e. a sentence in £.. The comparison relation C on £p determined by t:S., denoted by "p1 ::; P 2", where P t and p2 are two sentences in C1, is defined as:
1. in the case where there are arguments in A e sup porting some sentences p� such that p� ---+ P t. then Pl ::; P2 �r V{ et ,PD E Ae,((p� ---+ pt) ---+ (3{ e2 ,P�) EA., ( p �---+ P2 A { e i, p i) � h, p �)))); 2. in the case where there are no arguments support ing any sentence p� such that p� ---+ Pl! then P 1 ::; P2 � 3( e2, P2) E Ae, ( p�---> P 2 ·)
Informally, the first formula states that if there are ar guments supporting p1 or its subsets, i.e. there are justifications for conclusion PI, then we can say Pt is no more believable than P 2 if and only if for every justi fication for P t, there exists at least one justification for P 2 and this justification (argument) is no worse than that justification for p1• The second formula states that if there is no justification for conclusion P I, then we can say P 1 is no more believable than P2 if and only if P 2 has some justifications.
Using this relation, conclusions with respect to which conclusion is better supported than another is clarified. Intuitive terms can be defined.
Definition: Let C be a comparison relation on Cp and let P 11 P2 be two sentences in Cp, then we say
• Pl is less believable than P2 iff P1 :::; P2 and P2 1:. Pt;
• PI is as believable as P2 iff Pt � P 2 and P 2 � Pt;
• PI is not comparable to P 2 iff PI � P 2 and P2 � PI· Many other ways of decision making are also possible and sensible. For example, "choosing the best" from competitors (as we used in the examples in this pa per), and/or providing some standard arguments as thresholds.
But more than that, why and how the decision is reached can be easily explicated in 'RfS because of its symbolic representation. We can trace all support commanded by the competing choices to provide the reason why some of these supports are overwhelmed while others are taken as the basis for reaching the conclusion. This will provide justification for the re sults in cases where the results alone are not convincing enough.
Returning to our example above, for which we have built the evidence structure (section 2. 
An Example
In this section, using 'RES, we re-work the example of "The Hominids of East Thrkana" which is the key example in both Shafer (101 and Cohen [41. The ex position of the example from Shafer's paper is copied here.
3.1
The Example (I) A "robust" form with large cheek teeth and massive jaws. These fossils show wide-fanning cheekbones, very large molar and premolar teeth, and smaller incisors and canines. The brain cases have an average capacity of about 500 cubic centimetres, and there is often a bony crest run ning fore and aft across its top, which presumably provided greater area. for the attachment of the cheek muscles. Fos sils of this form have also been found in South Africa and East Asia, and it is generally agreed that they should all be classified as members of the species A ustralopithecus ro bustus. (II) A Smaller and slenderer (more "fragile") form that lacks the wide-flaring cheekbones of I, but has similar cranial capacity and only slightly less massive molar and premolar teeth. (III) A large-brained (c. 850 cubic em) and small-jawed form that can be confidently identified with the Homo erectus specimens found in Java and northern China.
The placement of the three forms in the geological strata in East Tu rkana shows that they were contemporaneous with each other. How many distinct species do they represent?
Walker and Leakey admit five hypotheses:
1. I, II, Ill are all forms o{ a single, extremely variable species.
2. There are two distinct species: one Australopithecus robustus, has I as its male {orm and II as its female form; the other, Homo erectus, is represented by III.
3. There are two distinct species: one, Australopithecus robustus, is represent by I; the other has III, the so called Homo erectus form, as its male form, and II as its female form.
4.
There are two distinct species: one is represented by the fragile form II; the other, which is highly variable, consists of I and III.
The three forms represent three distinct species.
Here are the items of evidence, or arguments, that Walker and Leakey use in their qualitative assessment of the prob abilities of these five hypotheses:
I. Hypothesis 1 is supported by general theoretical ar guments to the effect that distinct hominid species cannot co-exist after one of them has acquired cul ture.
2. Hypothesis 1 and 4 are doubtful because they pos tulate extreme adaptations within the same species: The brain seems to overwhelm the chewing apparatus in III, while the opposite is true in I.
3. There are difficulties in accepting the degree of sexual dimorphism postulated by hypotheses 2 and 3. Sex ual dimorphism exists among living anthropoids, and there is evidence from elsewhere tha.t hints that dental dimorphism of the magnitude postulated by hypothe sis 2 might have existed in extinct hominids. The di morphism postulated by hypothesis 3, which involves females having roughly half the cranial capacity of males, is less plausible.
4.
Hypotheses I and 4 are also impugned by the fact that specimens of type I have not been found in Java. and China, where specimens of type III are abundant.
5. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are similarly impugned by the absence of specimens of type II in Java. and China.
Before specimens of type III were found in the Koobi Fora Formation, Walker and Leakey thought it likely that I and II specimens constituted a single species. Now on the basis of the total evidence, they consider hypothesis 5 the most probable.
'RES Design
Following the terminology of Shafer and Tversky, we will call our representation of the example using 'Rf.S as a "design of evidence". The design is as follows.
e1: "the theory";
e2: "Absence of type I and II among III in Far East"; e;j: "Difference between type i and type j".
• Cp = {B1, B2, Ba, B4, Bs}, where Bs = Three species.
• Let we have A= A' U {( e ' A e", p ) j{e' , p ) E A', {e " , p ) E A'}.
Notice we convert arguments against some state ments to be arguments supporting the comple mentary statements, as we did in the example in the previous sections, and we have not considered arguments with disjuncted presumptions. Also consider A -A'. Adding this subset of ar guments to A is equivalent to adding a rule "if both e ' and e" individually support p , then e' A e" supports p" . There are counter examples for this rule. Since we have not discussed how general this rule is and how well it can be justified, we did not put this rule as a requirement for nes.
• 'R = { e12 -< ell e1 -< e2 A e13, e12-< e1a,e23-< e13}
u{( e ,p') = ( e ,p" ) j( e, p'), ( e,p" ) E A}, where e' -< e" denotes V( e ',p'), ( e", p ") E A, (( ( e', p') ::=; (e",p")) A ({e", p "):!:. ( e', p '))).
The reasons for these relationships in n can be found from the exposition of the example.
-The first relationship is based on the situa tion before III has been found; the theoretical support for B1 is overwhelming. After III was found, this support is overwhelmed by new considerations (the second relationship). Ob viously, the condition e2 1\ e13 is sufficient to make the choice of conclusion as can be seen from the original example. But this condi tion might be not necessary. It might be true that some weaker conditions, e.g. e23Ae2; e13 only; or even e23 alone can also overwhelm e1 and make the choice of conclusion. But where exactly the breaking point lies cannot be determined form the example and we are not in a position to judge this. The third and fourth relationships are based on the fact that the bigger the difference, the stronger this difference supports "differ ent species". The last part of n is equivalent to adding a rule "if a piece of evidence supports many hypotheses, it supports them equally". This is not a very general case. For example, a piece of statistical evidence hardly supports any different hypotheses equally. In our ex ample, we have many equivalences such like {e12, B3) = (e12, B4} which is because Ba and B4 reflect the difference between I and II equally. It just so happens that we can put these relationships concisely.
'l(TS -A Relative Method for Evidential Reasoning 7
Using the evidence structure built above, evidence can be accumulated and hypotheses can be chosen.
Before III was found It can be seen that the only arguments that can be triggered are those with presumption of e1 or e12. While e1 is rendered a better evidence, the conclusion it supports, i.e. B1, is the best supported hypothesis. Notice that since III has not been found yet, B1 is equivalent to the statement "I and II form one species".
After III was found This time, all arguments are triggered. Considering those arguments support ing B2, B3, and B4, we can find that for every such argument, there is an argument with equal weight supporting B5, but not otherwise. Thus we know Bs is more believable than B2, B3, and B4• At the same time, there is an argument ( e2Ae1a, Bs) sup porting B5 which is strong enough to overwhelm the only argument (et, Bt) supporting Bt. Thus, B5 is also more believable than B1 and so B5 is the best choice. Notice that we are also able to say "B2 is more believable than B3". This is true not only be cause B2 commands support from e2 while B3 doesn't (as Cohen noticed) but also because B2 commands support from e13 which is stronger than the support Ba commands from e23 and e12 · This concludes our presentation of the R.fS design for this example. In the rest of this section, we briefly compare the R.fS design with the designs of Shafer and Cohen.
3.3
Comparison to other methods
It can be noticed that representing strengths of argu ments by relative strength is at an abstraction level between the level of addressing factors (reasons or en dorsements) and the level of using numbers. This dif ference of levels leads us to the following points.
In Shafer's paper [10] , two designs, a Bayesian design (conditioning design, in contrast with total design) and a belief function design are presented. The belief func tion design turns out to be more intuitive or even more correct in a sense. But it is obvious that the numbers, both the probabilities and belief function values in the designs, are given quite arbitrarily. One is tempted strongly to question their relevance as well as their correctness.
Apart from the arbitrary nature of the numbers, their high abstraction level also makes these two designs in capable of reflecting some subtle but interesting infer ences. For example, as we noticed earlier, it might so happen that only a difference as big as that between I and III is strong enough to overrule our faith in the theory, so that Ba, honouring this difference, will be better than B1• With the two designs of Shafer, we will have to change the numbers. But how can we change these numbers to reflect such subtle differences if these numbers are related to the situation we are considering indirectly and are assessed quite arbitrarily?
In Cohen's book [4] , a work on evidential reasoning is reported. One explicitly stated purpose of his study is to see "how far one can go in evidential reasoning without measures of evidence" and the two basic obser vations on which his work is based are that "we know much about uncertainty besides belief measures" and "it is extremely difficult to assess these numbers." Try ing to circumvent the problems, he avoids numbers by replacing them with "endorsements" which are records of reasons for believing or disbelieving a hypothesis.
The example above serves as a main example for his exposition of the endorsement model and is worked out as another design using the endorsement model where the numbers in Shafer's two designs are replaced by endorsements (reasons pro or con different hypothe ses).
The obvious problem with this design is its complexity. The design is capable of reflecting some subtle reason ing, but it has the limitation that it has no facilities to specify the strengths of arguments. For this exam ple, using the endorsement model we cannot capture Walker and Leakey's original statement that "The sec ond hypothesis, we think, is more likely to be correct than the third". This, as we have already seen, has been reflected elegantly in 'R.fS.
In fact, this defect is noticed by the author himself, which leads him to say that " ... an inability and unwill ingness to specify the relative weight of endorsements can limit the usefulness of the endorsement-based ap proach". This poses an interesting question of how well the endorsement model goes together with 'RfS because though we believe that comRarison relation ships between arguments form a suitable interface for evidential reasoning, information at a more detailed level might be interesting and helpful. However, it seems to us that such a detailed level as that provided by endorsements is not usually required. This is the case in the example. 4 
Summary
In this paper, we have described a method for eviden tial reasoning based on representing arguments and re flecting the relative strengths of arguments. Examples are presented showing its usage.
We have achieved some other results with 'RfS as well [1] . For example, we have formalized the method to be a logic in which the constraints are reflected as some axioms; we have implemented it; we have shown that when making choices from competitive alterna tives based on available evidence is our only concern, 'RfS is capable of representing all information con veyed by any belief functions; we have established that 'RfS is capable of reflecting the belief construction pro cess advocated in [9] ; we have shown that absolute measurement [6] such as probabilities (5] , belief degrees [8] , and certainty degrees [12] can also be represented using 'RfS by introducing some "canonical examples" [10] as representatives of such numbers [2] ; and we have shown that 'RfS can also represent many patterns of common sense reasoning.
Together those results show that 'RfS is a flexible and potentially powerful representation method, comple mentary to other alternative methods.
